

Co-choreographing with AI: Novelty, intelligence, and skill

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ABSTRACT

This paper asks what cognitive mechanisms enable the emergence of novel choreographic material in AI-assisted choreography. I defend three interrelated claims. First, current AI systems do not generate novelty independently, since their outputs consist in statistical recombination of existing movement patterns. Second, human-AI interaction expands the choreographic search space and yields more varied material than either system alone. Third, novelty arises through the coordination of heterogeneous representations (e.g., linguistic, imagistic, and sensorimotor) via cross-format translation and bodily evaluation. I argue that these processes converge in a distinctive, trainable skill: co-choreographing with AI. Finally, I contend that this activity is best understood as a form of co-intelligence in action, and that any grammar of co-choreography must be grounded in the cognitive organization underlying this coordinated creative process.

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Setting the stage

Semiotic accounts of choreography have long emphasized that dance derives meaning both from the way it refers to the world and from the internal organization of its own movement vocabulary and syntax (see, e.g., Foster 1986; Maiorani 2021). The present paper addresses a complementary question: what cognitive structures and mechanisms enable novel choreographic material to emerge when choreography is jointly produced by human and artificial intelligences? While the ideas developed here originate within analytic philosophy of mind, they concern notions that are central to semiotics, including representation, meaning, translation, coordination, and creativity.¹

¹ For an introduction to some core semiotics questions, I rely, among others, on Sebeok (2001).

The encounter between semiotics and dance is already a peculiar and relatively underdeveloped one, let alone in its relation to cognition and AI. One main reason for why a semiotic account of dance can be difficult to provide is that:

At first sight, dance does not seem to make *sense* [my emphasis], given that it cannot relate to the linguistic concept of the sign. [...] There is a rather small number of researches on dance both in its generality and on particular dances. (De Luca 2017: 58)

Bridging the divide between dance, semiotics, and cognition is more than a lexical or interdisciplinary exercise. Although both dance semiotics and cognitive studies are concerned with the notion of ‘representation,’ they typically address different explanatory questions. Semiotics is principally concerned with how meaning is generated, communicated, and interpreted through *signs*. A semiotic account of dancing:

[...] offers a blueprint for choreographic meaning, assimilating many choreographic conventions into five broad categories: (1) the *frame* – the way the dance sets itself apart as a unique event; (2) the *mode of representation* – the way the dance refers to the world; (3) the *style* – the way the dance achieves an individual identity in the world and in its genre; (4) the *vocabulary* – the basic units or ‘moves’ from which the dance is made; and (5) the *syntax* – the rules governing the selection and combination of moves.² (Foster 1986: 59)

According to this characterization, the mode of representation is a way for dance to referring to the world. My complementary interest in this paper is in the *representational structures* and processing that make the aforementioned mode of representation cognitively tractable.

Whereas semiotics is above all concerned with how representations function as signs the present account instead asks what cognitive mechanisms allow such signifying processes to occur in the first place. My aim is to identify some of the structural conditions that underlie the production, transformation, and stabilization of choreographic signs when human and artificial intelligences jointly participate in creative practice. The present paper integrates a representational story to a problem of allegedly limited scope as the emergence of novel dance material in AI-assisted choreography. While the discussion is restricted to this particular case, the proposed framework may also prove relevant to other forms of AI-assisted artistic and performative creation.

² All emphases in these quotations are my own.

I defend three interrelated claims about co-choreographing with AI. First, current AI systems do not generate novelty on their own: their outputs remain constrained by training data and consist primarily in recombination of existing movement patterns. Second, choreographic processes involving sustained human-AI interaction tend to produce more novel outcomes than either traditional choreographic methods or AI-generated material considered in isolation. Third, this increase in novelty is best explained by the joint operation of two forms of intelligence. Artificial systems expand the space of available possibilities and generate structurally coherent proposals that would be difficult to anticipate within human practice alone. Human choreographers, in turn, perform cognitively indispensable work: they try out, evaluate, rehearse, and transform these proposals through their own cognitive and bodily expertise, selectively stabilizing some trajectories, sequences, and other movement features while abandoning others.

1. Contemporary dance, choreography, and AI

Contemporary dance is a privileged site of choreographic exploration. It allows for a wide range of movement possibilities, and yet it remains structured by physical and task-based constraints, within which new material can emerge. A simple task, such as drawing one's name in space using only the head, illustrates how guided exploration can generate novel movement sequences (cf. Flatt 2019). This and similar practices foreground choreography not as the execution of predefined ideas, but as a process of structured creativity.

Also, contemporary dance is a blend of styles, influences, and improvisation, which makes it a malleable performative art, with high potential for integrating technological advances in its developments. Recent choreographic practices increasingly incorporate artificial intelligence systems trained on large archives of human movement. For example, the project *AISOMA* uses Wayne McGregor's choreographic repertoire as training material for machine learning models capable of generating movement sequences that can be explored, transformed, and integrated into choreographic processes. More broadly, recent studies document the growing use of machine learning tools in dance creation and performance, overviewing both potential gains and concerns.³

Artificial systems applied to dance do not merely record or reproduce movement: they propose structured variations on existing patterns, thereby entering the generative process of choreography itself.

At first glance, AI-systems are constrained by their training data and by the statistical architectures through which that data is processed. Their outputs are therefore

³ For a detailed overview of the uses of machine learning in dance, I rely on Nogueira et al. (2024: 62-65).

best understood as probabilistically guided reconfigurations of prior material, rather than as instances of autonomous creativity. If novelty depended solely on the internal capacities of such systems, its scope would appear limited.

However, drawing on recent claims on the nature of co-intelligence (cf. Mollick 2024) and on theories of cognitive representational pluralism (e.g., Camp 2007; Burge 2018; Quilty-Dunn 2020; Shepherd 2021), I contend that choreographic novelty in AI-assisted contexts emerges from the interaction between two distinct intelligences, one human and one artificial, each of them contributing to a common task with their available resources. On this view, choreography is neither the product of a single agent nor the mere output of an artificial intelligence process. It is a coordinated activity with multiple representational resources – e.g., linguistic prompts, imagistic structures, algorithmic outputs, and sensorimotor exploration – that are coordinated and continuously negotiated. Novel choreographic material arises at the interface between these resources, through processes that neither system could realize independently while achieving the same outputs.

A key point of the proposed view is that AI-assisted choreography does not require properly shared representations (motor or of whatever kind) between human and artificial systems. Coordination rather depends on alignment on task goals. Transformation rules, constraints, and evaluative criteria then govern how representations of each intelligence system are produced and manipulated while contributing to the same choreographic goal.

This framework highlights the respective contributions of human and artificial intelligence – for one, with respect to the role of affect. In human choreographic practice, affectivity often determines salience and selection, shaping which possibilities are taken up and developed. The absence of such affective component in current AI systems introduces a productive asymmetry within the interaction, one that is central to the emergence of novel outcomes and leaves room for a division of labor between the human choreographer and the chosen AI system. If co-choreographing with AI is understood as a cooperative process, then an important question concerns the nature and structure of such *co-intelligence*. The present account does not compete with semiotic explanations; rather, it addresses a different explanatory level, as I am here only concerned with the representations that precede and sustain dance and choreography, and how their cognitive building blocks operate to produce and maintain dance practice.⁴

In sum, the main claim is that choreographic novelty emerges from the interaction between different systems, as marked out by the continuous negotiation between heterogeneous representational structures. In this light, we need to understand creativity and novelty as the upshot of coordinated activity between human and artificial intelligence.

⁴ For genuinely semiotic approaches, compare Dondero et al. (2025); d'Armenio et al. (2025).

2. Choreography as a structured practice

A typical trait of much choreographic practice in contemporary dance is that it often does not begin from fully specified ideas ready to be executed, but from structured exploratory procedures in which constraints, representational resources, and coordination mechanisms jointly shape the emergence of movement. For this reason, choreographic work in contemporary dance already provides a model of generative practice by itself, within which the integration of AI can be observed as a fruitful development.

2.1. Constraints as generative conditions

Choreographic practices can be said to be constrained in various ways. It is precisely the presence of constraints that enables the production of new material. There exist constraints pertaining to dance traditions, pre-existing materials, context, and many other relevant circumstances. More specifically, there are stylistic and practice-specific constraints, including training background, technique, and genre conventions. They all define repertoires of possible movement and transformation allowed within each choreographic setting. However important, these are not the kind of constraints I am interested in, although they may exercise an influence on which *cognitive constraints* apply to any given choreographic context. I here focus on the cognitive constraints as those that apply to the mental representations supporting the choreographic work. By *mental representation*, I refer to a cognitive state or structure that carries content and is available for cognitive processing. Representations differ not only in what they represent (i.e., their content) but also in the *format* through which content is structured, whether, for example, linguistic, imagistic, or sensorimotor. Content-wise, I distinguish between the following main classes of constraints.

First, there are *task constraints*, often introduced by means of instructions. Simple prompts, such as drawing one's name in space using only head movement or generating movement based on a limited set of action verbs (e.g. 'fold,' 'resist,' 'scatter'), restrict the available degrees of freedom while directing attention to specific movement parameters. These parameters structure the search space within which new possibilities can be explored by communicating what to do, and, at times, how to do it (cf. Flatt 2019). Tasks are typically communicated in language, though the instructions may vary in terms of precision, level of abstraction, and open-endedness.

Second, there are *bodily and physical constraints*. Movement is shaped by anatomical structure, balance, gravity, effort, and space. These constraints are not external limitations but intrinsic conditions of choreographic reasoning: they determine which movements are feasible, sustainable, and can be repeated over time.

Third, there are *temporal and musical constraints*, especially when choreography is developed in relation to rhythm, phrasing, or musical structure. Dancers must

somehow align movement with temporal patterns – whether by following, resisting, or reinterpreting them.

Consider, for example, a choreographer working with an AI system such as *AI-SOMA*. The choreographer may prompt the system to elaborate a short movement phrase while preserving a given stylistic quality. The AI generates several statistically plausible continuations, but these remain constrained by the task ('develop this phrase'), by bodily feasibility (whether the proposed transitions can actually be executed), and by temporal or musical requirements. The resulting choreography emerges not from unbidden generation, but from navigating multiple interacting constraints through repeated exchanges between the human and the artificial systems.

Taken together, the three aforementioned classes of constraints guide the creative process: they do not simply restrict action but actively shape the emergence of choreographic material by organizing the space of possibilities. Constraints operate on representations, and representations are available in different formats, as explained in the next section.

2.2. Multimodal and multi-format practice

Choreographic practice is both intrinsically multimodal – visual, auditory, tactile representations are jointly present almost at any time, whether or not practitioners are aware of them – and characterized by the coordination of heterogeneous representational formats, insofar as the represented content can take different structures.⁵ The interaction between heterogeneous representational formats is one main source of choreographic novelty.

Movement generation may begin from linguistic prompts ('to suspend,' 'to collapse'), imagistic representations (e.g., visualizing an animal's movement or a spatial trajectory),⁶ auditory patterns (musical phrasing, rhythm), or sensorimotor exploration grounded in bodily feedback. Different modalities (e.g., visual, auditory, tactile) and representational format (e.g., language-like, motor) tend not to be exchangeable: each affords different operations and levels of specificity (see, e.g., Shepherd 2021). Linguistic instructions can guide intention but remain underspecified with respect to movement dynamics; visually imagistic structures preserve spatial and qualitative features; sensorimotor representations provide precise, executable content but are often difficult to communicate verbally and reproduce identically over time.

Choreographic work involves continuous transitions and negotiations across these formats and modalities. A verbal instruction may be developed into a movement phrase; a visual image may be embodied and transformed; a rhythm may be perceived and used to move around space. At each stage, the structure of the relevant representation may change, and with it, the content that can be generated and manipulated.

⁵ I am here using the terms *format* and *structure* interchangeably.

⁶ On the use of mental imagery in movement creation, see, e.g., May et al. (2011).

2.3. Representational coordination and shared practice

Choreography is rarely an individual activity. It is a coordinated practice involving multiple agents – choreographers, dancers, and, in some cases, technological systems – who must align their actions without necessarily sharing identical representations. Each participant may share the process while preserving their own individual mental states and action representations.

Coordination is achieved by sharing commitment to a given goal as well as by sharing the creative process itself and/or demonstrative mechanisms to achieve a common task-goal. One example is the use of *marking*, as analyzed by Kirsh (2010; 2013): dancers rehearse movement in a reduced, schematic form, preserving key structural features while omitting full execution. Marking functions as an intelligible abbreviation of movement, allowing dancers to communicate, remember, and refine material efficiently and without over-exercising. It provides a shared external scaffold that supports coordination without requiring fully specified or identical internal representations.

In a nutshell, coordination relies on publicly accessible *cues* (e.g., verbal instructions, counts, spatial references, rhythm) and a shared commitment to the task at hand. Dancers align their behavior not by reproducing all the same internal states, which would be impossible or, in any case, difficult to recognize, but by coordinating with each participant in the process. Coordination is, in this light, a continuous negotiation of dance material, eventually adjusted and stabilized through practice.

2.4. Interim point

Contemporary choreography exhibits a few structural features that are common to several creative processes: it is constraint-driven, multimodal, multi-format, and coordinative. In addition, it exhibits sensorimotor constraints that play a central role, more evidently than in other creative domains. Novel movement emerges not from unconstrained or unbidden invention, but from structured exploration within a space defined by bodily and task-based representational constraints; it is generated through the interaction of representational formats; and it is stabilized through coordinated activity across agents.

On this basis, the introduction of AI systems inserts an additional representational system into an already complex set of constraints, formats, and coordination mechanisms. The question is therefore not whether AI can bring novelty into choreography, but how its contribution interacts with a human intelligence practice by making it even more generative than it already is.

3. Co-choreographing with AI

Current AI systems used in choreography operate on large datasets of recorded movement (see, e.g., *AISOMA*). Their outputs are generated through statistical learning of sequential patterns, that is, which movement tokens are likely to follow others. As such, they produce coherent recombination of existing material. This coherence is non-trivial: it reflects learned regularities of timing, transition, and spatial organization that are constitutive of choreographic practice. However, it does not amount to deliberate and autonomous creativity. For one, an artificial system does not really *explain* or *justify* its outputs. It does not select among viable alternatives based on justifying reasons or evaluative criteria (e.g., such as aesthetic, affective, or interpretative judgments). In what follows, I lay out a way to conceive of the respective contributions of the human and the artificial systems.

3.1. Human–AI division of choreographic labor

Within choreographic practice, AI outputs mostly function as *proposals*. They introduce candidate sequences into the process, but they do not determine their uptake. Selection, rejection, and adaptation are carried out by human agents who can evaluate, modify, and justify choreographic choices. This division of labor also serves to mitigate the impact of unstable or implausible outputs (analogous to ‘hallucinations’), that are filtered out through practice and interaction with the AI.

This proposal-generating role is explicitly reflected in recent choreographic practice. In his collaboration with AI technology, Wayne McGregor developed a system trained on his own choreographic repertoire, capable of generating real-time movement suggestions in the form of predicted sequences. The system produces a continuous stream of possible transitions – visualized through stick-figure projections – that dancers must interpret and enact in real time. As McGregor emphasizes, such systems can generate thousands of possibilities, far exceeding what could be explored in performance, while leaving dancers with the task of making sense of and stabilizing this material within practice. The challenge is precisely that the movement is not exhaustively specified in advance: dancers must respond to unfolding sequences and verify coherence through actual bodily performance. Ultimately, the artificial system does not determine choreographic outputs alone.

An artificial intelligence system may contribute to the choreographic process with what follows:⁷

1. Access to extensive movement datasets;
2. Suggestions for transformation and elaboration of motion;

⁷ The current list is likely non-exhaustive and open to additions.

3. Generation of structurally cohesive sequences (i.e., transitions that are statistically likely to occur);
4. Iterative feedback through interaction with the human intelligence.

On the other side, the human choreographer contributes:

1. Physical testing for executability (either just rehearsed in mental imagery, or actually performed);⁸
2. Affective filtering (e.g., how a movement feels to perform, i.e., its expressive and conative qualities);
3. Stylistic and contextual assessment (overall fit with the work, coherence with prior material);
4. Articulate reasoning (why a transition, rhythm, or spatial pathway is eventually retained or modified).

In this picture, the human choreographer performs cognitively indispensable work: filtering outputs, identifying relevant structure, and assigning reasons to selected movement trajectories. The *AISOMA* example illustrates this division of labor. While the AI system proposes alternative continuations of a movement phrase, the choreographer evaluates their feasibility, expressive quality, and fit within the developing work.

3.2. Artificial expansion of the choreographic search space

AI systems expand the search space of choreography by generating a wide range of structurally coherent variations that may not be otherwise produced within a given practice. This expansion has two main advantages. The first is exploratory gain, that is, a rapid production of multiple alternatives across timing, phrasing, and transition patterns. All those alternatives would hardly be represented even by the most skilled dancer or choreographer, for reasons of cognitive load and limited synchronic retrieval of options. The second advantage is structural cohesion, consisting in outputs that respect learned regularities, making them immediately workable rather than random or intractable.

As it happens with other uses of AI beyond dance, the extent and quality of this search expansion importantly depend on prompt design. Effective prompting requires domain-specific knowledge: to obtain non-trivial outputs, the user must encode all information and cues that may meaningfully guide generation. It may indeed be the case that producing distinctive results depends on understanding the domain more deeply than other users (Mollick 2024). In choreography, this translates into informed prompts from a skilled user that steer the system toward more specific regions of the available movement space.⁹

⁸ See, e.g., Jeannerod (2006) on the equivalence in timing between mentally simulated and actually executed movements.

⁹ Section 5 comes back to the skilled character of the choreographic work.

3.3. Interim point

AI contributes coherent recombination and search-space expansion, but not autonomous creativity. Its outputs acquire choreographic plausibility only through human evaluation, justification, and adaptation. This division of roles establishes the conditions for co-intelligence: a system that generates structured possibilities, and an agent that selects and stabilizes them under their own constraints and reasons. I have so far framed such division of labor in cognitive and representational terms. Novel and creative outputs can be considered the function or purpose of joint representational work.

4. Co-Intelligence and novelty

Choreographic work with AI is best understood as a joint and intelligent enterprise, rather than as the output of either system taken alone. On the assumption that human and artificial intelligences differ – among other things – in the form (or format) of representations they are capable of generating, an account of co-choreography should endorse *format pluralism* with respect to choreographic contents.

4.1. Cross-format translation

Typically, AI outputs enter the practice in a format that is not directly executable by a human body: predicted sequences, abstracted kinematics, or simplified visualizations. To become choreographic material, these outputs must be translated from abstract structures to sensorimotor routines, often mediated by linguistic cues or imagistic scaffolds.¹⁰ This translation also serves to fill in parameters (timing, weight, orientation), while suppressing others, and introducing new relations (e.g., phrasing, spatial pathways).

Because each format affords different operations, translation is a site of transformation. A statistically likely transition suggested by the model may be realized as tension, suspension, or redirection depending on how it is embodied and implemented. Conversely, some generated sequences will fail under translation (e.g., unstable balance, infeasible transitions), exposing limitations that may be invisible at the algorithmic level. Novelty arises in these crossings: not from recombination alone, but from how recombined structures are reformatted and implemented in task-based practice.

4.2. Feasibility scanning

Selection of representational content is carried out through bodily evaluation. Human agents test candidate sequences against:

¹⁰ On the main formulation of the interface challenge between heterogeneous structures in human cognition (i.e., propositional and non-propositional), I rely on Butterfill and Sinigaglia (2014). Several solutions to the challenge have been put forward since then.

- *feasibility* (can it be physically executed?)
- *stability* (does it sustain over time and across repetitions?)
- *effort and dynamics* (how does it distribute weight, tension, timing?)
- *affective salience* (what it feels like to perform; what it affords expressively)
- *contextual fit* (coherence with existing material and task goals)

These criteria are not all readily available to the AI. They function as filters and selectors over the proposal space, converting possibilities into choreographically meaningful choices. Importantly, evaluation is iterative: accepted material is refined, recombined, or rejected upon further testing. This loop (proposal → implementation → assessment → revision) stabilizes sequences that count as choreographic outcomes.

4.3. Coordination without shared representations

In this framework, coordination for the purposes of choreographing does not require shared representations between human and AI intelligences. Rather, it is achieved through alignment under the guidance of:

- *task goals* (e.g., what is intended to be achieved, the abstract plan)
- *transformation rules* (how outputs may be modified or combined)
- *public cues* (counts, spatial markers, notation, marking)
- *evaluative criteria* (feasibility, style, affect, coherence)

In a nutshell, AI contributes variation and structure; human agents mostly contribute evaluation and justification. Coordination consists in the division of labor under a shared commitment. For coordination to work, there should be both a shared commitment to the task and responsiveness to each system's constraints. Of course, some constraints might be temporarily unavailable, and not all constraints might be necessary at all stages of the choreographing process. The next section expands on how novel outputs arise at the interface between human and AI systems, and suggests that their co-intelligence can be trained as a distinctive skill.

5. Co-choreographing with AI as a skill

The division of respective contributions from human and AI systems allows us to characterize more precisely the nature of the choreographic process and its outputs. Compared to non-assisted choreography, co-choreographic processes can yield greater variability in terms of outputs. By expanding the search space and introducing structured variation, AI enables practitioners to encounter possibilities that would be unlikely to emerge through unaided exploration. At the same time, the need to interpret and stabilize these possibilities imposes additional demands on the choreographer, requiring sustained engagement with potentially unfamiliar material.

The ability to produce choreography with AI can thus be understood as a distinctive and *trainable skill*, rather than as a by-product of either human creativity or machine output. In a study conducted on expert breakdancers, Shimizu and Okada (2018) show that the hallmarks of expert performers' development of skill are the degree of skill acquisition, the contents or knowledge included in practice, and the dancers' stated purposes for practicing. In a similar vein, philosophers of mind have characterized skilled action via several interrelated features, including goal-directed control, sensitivity to feedback and norms, and the capacity for improvement through practice (cf. Fridland and Pavese 2020; Kind 2020).

Co-choreographing with AI broadly satisfies these criteria. First, co-choreographic activity is *goal-directed*: practitioners work under task constraints and artistic objectives that guide the generation and selection of movement. However, unlike standard cases of individual skill, the control of action is distributed, at least in part, in the joint activity. The generation of candidate sequences is delegated to the system, while the human agent retains control over evaluation, transformation, and stabilization. Skill, in this context, consists in managing the division of labor effectively. Second, co-choreography exhibits systematic *sensitivity to feedback*. AI-generated outputs are continuously tested against bodily, stylistic, and contextual criteria, and the results of this evaluation feed back into both prompt design and subsequent selection. This iterative loop (generation, testing, revision) mirrors core features of skilled performance, but extends them across human and artificial contributions. Third, co-choreographic practice is, in some way, *norm-governed*. Movement sequences are not merely produced but assessed according to standards of feasibility, coherence, aesthetics, and fit within a developing work. These standards or norms are supplied and enforced by the human practitioner, but are also shaped by AI-generated material. Skill involves the capacity to keep up with the choreographic exploration, while applying such norms. Fourth, co-choreographing is *learnable and improvable*. Practitioners may develop expertise in prompt design, in recognizing structure within generated outputs, and in efficiently navigating large spaces of possibilities. As in other domains of skilled action, performance improves with experience: expert users are better able to extract non-trivial material, avoid generic outputs, and stabilize novel movement sequences.

These features indicate that co-choreography is not reducible to either machine creativity or a simple extension of human choreographic skill. What can be trained is how to formulate effective prompts, recognize when generated material is worth pursuing, test and adapt material through coordinated practice, and transform it into stable choreographic outputs.

6. Toward a cognitive grammar of co-choreography

The internal coherence of dance depends on its movement vocabulary and syntax (Foster 1986). The present account suggests that, in AI-assisted choreography, identifying any such a syntax is considerably more challenging since choreographic material is generated and transformed across heterogeneous representational formats and systems before being stabilized in executable form. In particular, the actual interaction between different intelligences is possible insofar as representations are able to coordinate and to be manipulated by the joint work. To better explain the relevance of the cognitive underpinnings of AI-assisted choreography, we should therefore consider the possibility of individuating a representational syntax for co-choreographing as the backbone of a semiotic account of co-choreography.¹¹

However, there are at least two major obstacles to defining a single representational grammar for the task of co-representing and co-creating choreography. First, we would need a definitive account of mixed-format human cognition, which we currently lack. Second, in AI-assisted choreography, the continuous feedback between human and artificial systems introduces a high degree of representational instability: generated sequences are constantly transformed, embodied, and modified, making it difficult to stabilize unfolding structures as persistent symbols. In many cases, such stabilization occurs only when movement is fixed in a performable and repeatable action representation.

One strategy is that of elaborating a functional account of representations for co-choreographing. The idea would be that coordination in mental structures – even when arising from different intelligence systems – is realized by sharing the same task-goal. If my hypothesis is correct, novelty in co-choreography emerges through the interaction of systems that do not necessarily share an identical representational basis, but are coordinated by means of shared practice.

7. Conclusions

This paper has argued that choreographic novelty in AI-assisted contexts does not arise from either human creativity or machine generation taken in isolation, but from their coordinated work. This account has two broader implications. First, it contends that co-choreographing with AI constitutes a distinctive and trainable skill, grounded in the ability to co-work with AI systems. Second, the account proposed here suggests that understanding AI-assisted choreography requires explaining not only how choreographic signs acquire meaning, but also how heterogeneous representational systems become coordinated in the first place. This cognitive architecture might provide one possible foundation for a future semiotics of co-choreography with AI.

¹¹ Compare Kruk (2022) arguing that bodily movement is simultaneously a physical event and a signifying event.

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