Review Article
Preliminaries to a taxonomy of intersemiosis*

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The specificity of a semiotic approach to translation is often taken to reside in two dic-
tums, separately, or more commonly compounded, one of then due to Roman Jakobson, and
the other to Charles Sanders Peirce. The first shibboleth consists in Jakobson’s (1959: 233)
extension of the term ‘translation’, beyond what he still terms ‘translation proper’, that is, the
‘interpretation of verbal signs by means of some other language’, to include also two other in-
stances, ‘rewording’, or the ‘interpretation of verbal signs by means of other signs of the same
language’ as well as to ‘transmutation’, or ‘the interpretation of verbal signs by means of signs
of nonverbal signs systems’. We will return to the second shibboleth below.

There can be no disputing the creative achievement of this model which is also a met-
aphor, in the sense in which Max Black (1962), following Aristotle, identified those two: as
procedure for discovering new things, the means for finding out, and even creating, similarities
never observed before (see also Ricoeur 1975; Sonesson 2015a). A metaphor may very well
be at the origin of a domain of study. But, if the study is going to be fruitful, it cannot abide
by this single discovery. This is why I suggested in two recent papers (Sonesson 2014a, b) that
the time had come to take the metaphor further and also spell out what the differences are
between these three kinds of intersemiotic acts. Dinda Gorlée (2015) has now published a
book in which, clearly quite independently of my suggestion, she undertakes to separate what
she calls “translation” in quotation marks (2015: 9) into Jakobson’s translation proper, that is
translation without quotation marks, and transduction, which seems to correspond to what
Jakobson calls transmutation (and what Sonesson 2014b: 268 called ‘transposition’).

This is all the more remarkable as Gorlée (1994), together with Susan Petrilli (2003) and
Peeter Torop (2003), were among the scholars whom I took to task for neglecting to go be-
yond the similarity of these semiotic acts, to inquire into how they were different. After saluting

* Review of Gorlée, Dinda. 2015. From translation to transduction: The glassy essence of inter-
semiosis. Tartu. Tartu University Press.
this achievement, however, I would like to take this occasion, to enlarge on the residue which I think remains of the original metaphor in Gorlée’s work, as well as to derive some inspiration from points made by Gorlée which may help in bringing the study of translational semiotics forward – in the sense of “translation” in quotation marks.

1. The ‘translation’ internal to basic semiosis

One can always rely on Gorlée (1994; 2015) to dive deeply into all kinds of Peircean quotations, in the business of which she is exceptionally well-versed, including those quotation only available to the happy few who have been drinking at the manuscript source at Bloomington. In this sense, Gorlée’s new book, just as her earlier one, is the wellspring indicated for those who want to find out, if possible, what Peirce really wanted to say. This is to say that Gorlée’s new book has a value already as a vademecum for the interpretation of Peirce. Here, however, I will be exclusively involved with its contributions to the study of “translation” in quotation marks, that is, to the study of intersemiosis broadly understood.

There is of course a rationale for Gorlée intermingling translation studies with the interpretation of Peirce’s philosophy. Indeed, as I pointed out (in Sonesson 2014a, b), the second shibboleth, after Jakobson’s metaphors, which allows to recognize the current semiotic approach to intersemiosis, derives from Peirce’s contention that meaning is a process consisting in the ‘translation’ (with quotation marks, no doubt) of the parts of the sign (that is, the representamen, the object, and the interpretant) into other signs. In Gorlée’s book, as so often, this idea gets fundamentally curtailed into the ‘translation’ of interpretants into other interpretants, and so on. Whatever the phenomenon thus described by Peirce is, it can certainly not be identified with translation in any of the very broad Jakobsonean meanings. In a by now classic passage, Jacques Derrida (1967) used Peirce’s chain of interpretants to elucidate the Saussurean structure of language, which he then chose to generalize to the world at large (though he certainly had other motives: see Sonesson 2015b). And Terrence Deacon (1997), starting out from the same chain of interpretants, ended up, without knowing it, proposing a view of language which is indistinguishable from the Saussurean langue (See Sonesson 2006). They may not have been all that wrong.

The truth is, Peircean translation may be this, and many other things. Different meanings can be given to the chain of interpretants, some at the level of the linguistic system, and other at those of the specific speech situation. Among the first, one may distinguish the syntagm/paradigm duality, in the sense of Saussure and, more specifically, Hjelmslev, which has a clear grammatical meaning; the broader ‘semantic field’, in the sense of classical German linguistics, which is more of a semantic notion; and language structure as a whole, consisting of a network of relations to relations, which, according to Saussure, is the reality behind the superficial figure of the signifier and the signified. If you are a believer in Chomskyan metaphysics, as of the sixties or the seventies of the
last century, you may even add the whole paraphernalia of deep structure, transformations, filters, constraints, surface structure, and what have you, of which not much remains in the recent metaphysical instantiations of that theory. On the other hand, there are of course all the meanings which may be derived from a given discourse in a specific situation and/or context, which may go from simple instances of the connections offered by the system to logical reasoning, on one hand, and to socially shared or more or less personal associations, on the other. Perhaps Peircean translation corresponds to all these cases, but then it needs to be differentiated. As far as I know, general linguistics has not progressed very much in the study of the differences between these varied means of ‘translation’ internal to linguistic consciousness (and of which similar cases should be found in other semiotic resources), but even the account above, which is based on rather classical insights, goes much further than the Peircean notion of ‘translation’.

Clearly, the Peircean notion of translation is something more basic than what we normally call translation. It is conceivable, of course, that Peirce’s notion could be emended to yield a more precise notion of translation in the ordinary language sense of the term, but it does not seem to me that Gorlée manages to do so in her book. Not to stop the line of inquiry, to paraphrase Peirce, we need to rummage an area much greater than Peirce’s collected works, whether it is only in order to understand ‘“translation” in quotation marks’ as envisaged by Peirce, or whether we want to grasp the differences between Jakobsonean translation proper, rewording and transmutation.

2. In-between languages: Translation and semiotranslation

It can probably be taken for granted that Gorlée’s translation outside of inverted commas is the same thing as Jakobson’s ‘translation proper’. It is, however, only in the second chapter (p. 20ff) that translation is defined, only to be superseded (p. 25f, 28ff) by the notion of ‘semiotranslation’. Translation, Gorlée (2015:20) says, ‘has the ideal goal to recreate the perfect one-way replacement of textual material of the source text in one language by equivalent textual material in another language’. Quite clearly, such a goal can never be realised, and thus has to be exchanged for ‘semiotranslation’. In numerous ways, Gorlée (2015: 25) tries to circumscribe the nature of ‘semiotranslation’, notably as a practice which instead of striving for “the “perfect” sign of logical Thirdness /.../ has become softened (or weakened) in the “imperfect” pseudo-semiosis of Peirce’s “quasi-minds”.

It is, however, only much further on into text, when Gorlée talks about translation as a kind of abduction, and when she connects semiotranslation to an exchange in terms of Peirce’s emotional, energetic, and logical interpretations, that this distinction starts to make sense.

The question remains, nevertheless, how to separate the ‘ideal goal’ of a semiotic act, and its actual possibilities of fulfilment, in view of the harsh realities of the world, or, in this case, of semiosis itself. Of course, there is no easy way of translating from one language to another, and as I remarked (in Sonesson 2014a, b), these difficulties become even greater when different
semiotic resources are involved. But either the goal of translation (proper) remains to establish such a close equivalence between two texts as is possible given their different employment of resources, and semiotranslation is simply the same thing as translation; or semiotranslation is another kind of semiotic act which has a different goal. As we will see, there are reasons to think that Gorlée may at least sometimes intend the latter interpretation (but then semiotranslation would seem to shade into transduction, as it also does in the later chapters).

Indeed, it may be true, as Thomas Munck (2000:4) suggests, that translators during the 18th century ‘did not always try to be “accurate”, and might act more as mediators by adapting an original work to the mind-set of the intended readership’. This is all the more unsurprising as, during the Middle Ages, even the act of copying a manuscript was not clearly distinguishable from commenting on it. Indeed, as Ian Macleod Higgins (1997) shows in his detailed study of the different versions of the famous mediaeval book called Mandeville’s Travels, which was rapidly translated into at least ten languages, the translators (apparently even more than the copyists using the same language) had no problem adding entire stories to the text, suppressing others, and even changing the ideological (i.e., at the time, religious) position from which the events were viewed. As far as I know, we have no record of what ‘translation’ meant at the time, and whether it was applied to this kind of secondary text, which often did not even tell its name. No matters what term was used, the idea of translation at the time was clearly different from the contemporary one. And, from a semiotic point of view, the essential task is to reconstruct what we nowadays mean by translation.

Elsewhere, I have suggested that translation proper is a double act of communication. To grasp the nature of translation, we have to start from a certain idea about the act of communication, which I have presented elsewhere (see Sonesson 1999; 2014a, b): according to this model, also the receiver is an active subject, who must concretise the artefact produced by the sender into a percept; any two parts in a game of communication will only have partly overlapping resources for interpretation at their disposal, and thus one will have to retrieve the resources of the other, or some part of them, for the act of communication to be successful; and communication may be rendered more difficult by the sender and receiver being situated in different cultures and/or using different languages, let alone different semiotic resources; and this is often enough true for all three participants in the double act of communication.

Given this model of communication, it becomes clear that the translator must be a doubly active subject, as interpreter and as creator of a new text. He or she is the receiver of one act of communication and the sender of another one. Any translation which is at all adequate as such, therefore, needs to take into account two contexts of sending and two contexts of receiving, though possibly to different extents. The first sender context is that of the original speaker/writer, and the second one is that of the translator himself. Similarly, there is the receiver context of the translated text and the receiver context of the translator himself.

For there to be a double act of communication, the content of both acts of communication
should be, in a qualified sense of the term, identical all through the acts, which is impossible, for different reasons, in what Jakobson has called intralinguistic and intersemiotic ‘translation’. It is not the sequence of one act of communication and another one which is a translation of that act into another verbal language which makes translation into a double act of communication, but the fact that this second act must take into account the situation of the sender and receiver of the original act, as well as of the act currently taking place. All through this process, the translator tries to convey the same meaning, to the extent that this is possible, to a receiver disposing of a different and/or more limited pool of knowledge. Translation proper is guided by the goal to get as close as possible to conveying the same idea. Other semiotic acts are possible, but if they do not follow this precept, they do not constitute instances of unqualified translation.

Gorlée (2015, 23, 59, 101ff., etc.) repeatedly seems to suggest, although never being very clear about it, that Saussure’s notion of language as consisting of a signifier and a signified should make translation all too easy, but this is a complete misconstrual. As my old professor of general linguistics, Bertil Malmberg (1971; 1974) never tired of observing, given the Saussurean conception of linguistic structure, translation should be impossible; and yet, according to Malmberg, it was necessary.2 This, clearly, is the same position taken by Gorlée (2015: 69ff), who, after citing the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, proceeds to downplay its import. She may be overdoing the latter, however, for, when quoting Hjelmslev’s classical example according to which ‘I do not know’ is differently formed in different languages, even at the level of words and word classes, she (p. 70ff) only includes, and extends, his examples from Indo-European languages. The fundamental point, however, is that the Saussurean notion of language, like that of Sapir-Whorf, seems to lead to an aporia, when confronted with the task of translation, and Gorlée would have been better advised to start from this aporia, in order to show that Peirce had a solution. Even in this case, however, she would have failed her task, because, as we’ve seen previously, Peirce’s notions are too general to be able to explain the particularity of translation proper, and even ‘“translation” in quotation marks’.

3. In-between different semiotic resources

On the face of it, Gorlée (2015: 9) is much clearer about what she means by transduction: it involves ‘the parallel of “translation” not applied to language but within the intermediality of speeches of non-linguistic texture between the doctrinal, the educational and the emotional aspects of different arts’. If the latter part of this definition already seems rather convoluted, the plot thickens in the chapter specially dedicated to transduction (Gorlée 2015: 91ff) as well as in the final note on the term (Gorlée 2015: 231ff). Transduction seems to be exemplified by such things as translating ‘a love letter from English to Chinese, a legal marriage contract from Arabic to Dutch, an operatic libretto from old Italian to modern English’, etc. (Gorlée 2015: 20, 91). These are fascinating examples, and I will later suggest that the introduction of such cases
is Gorlée’s essential contribution to the discussion of intersemiotic acts. Quite clearly, though, these are not cases of exchange of one semiotic resource for another; rather, they are translations with added complications, caused by the intercultural variation of the schemes regulating particular kinds of social practices. And here I think it is important not to confuse languages and cultures: although Mexican Spanish is not very different from the Spanish spoken in Spain, cultural practices are immensely different, notably as far as the idea of courteous behaviour in understood (see Dunér & Sonesson 2016). But, for the moment, our essential task it to single out the way in which translation proper differ from what Jakobson called transmutations.

Gorlée (2015: 17, 101, 109, etc.) refers at several places to a paper by Michael Silverstein (2003), which bears the title ‘Translation, transduction, transformation’. In this paper there is a definition of transduction (not quoted by Gorlée) which appears to be even more entangled than Gorlée’s own variety, but which might still give us an inkling of what is at stake:

a process of reorganizing the source semiotic organization (here, in the original problem, denotationally meaningful words and expressions of a source language occurring in co[n]text) by target expressions-in-co(n)text of another language presented through perhaps semiotically diverse modalities differently organized. (And let us stipulate for the time being that both source and target are, in general outlines, multidimensionally ‘like’.) (Silverstein 2003: 83).

Transduction, in this sense, clearly is not necessarily Jakobsonean transmutation. Rather, like Gorlée’s term semiotranslation, Silverstein’s (and Gorlée’s) transduction seems to be called upon to indicate that translation, as Malmberg said, is necessary though in principle impossible. Or, in other terms, in spite of the Shannon & Weaver model which Jakobson and Eco have imposed on us, translation is not like encoding and decoding, whether these terms refer to substituting the Morse alphabet for our ordinary alphabet, or substituting a series of zeros and ones for anything shown on the computer monitor (see Sonesson 1999). It can be done from the inside of Searle’s Chinese room, only because someone has already done the job of producing the book consulted by the language blind man inside the room. If I understand correctly, transduction and transformation, according to Silverstein (2003: 91) and Gorlée (2015: 117ff) are simply further steps away from the impossible ideal of translation as transcodage. But, at the end of the day, this is simply what we ordinarily mean by translation (proper).

Before we inquiry further into this issue, it will be useful to spell out the difference between ‘translation proper’ and Jakobsonean transmutation (which I take to be a transduction according to Silverstein in which source and target are not ‘multidimensionally “like”’). As Umberto Eco (2004) rightly remarks, a ‘translation’ from language to film or even to a static picture has to add a lot of new facts (specific looks of the persons, etc.). As I have observed out elsewhere (Sonesson 2014a, b), this remark may be countered by pointing out that the same thing applies when going from
one language to another, and this fact no doubt inspired Silverstein and Gorlée to use a new term also for this transaction. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the informational discrepancy between, for instance, a picture and a piece of language, will necessarily be immensely greater. After all, what languages choose to pick up as relevant from experienced reality may vary enormously, but it always varies in one dimension, whereas some other semiotic resources are multidimensional.

Shakespeare’s play *Macbeth*, which we only know as a piece of linguistic text, has given rise to numerous filmic interpretations, among which by Orson Welles, Akira Kurosawa and Roman Polanski; it has also, of course, been at the origin of numerous theatrical representations, of which most have not been preserved to the present, beginning with those of Shakespeare’s own company. Suffice it to consider just the title personage, Macbeth. ‘Translating’ this single personage into visual form depends on an innumerable series of choices on many different dimensions: kind of crown, shape of head, shape of nose, cheek contours, colour of eyes, kind of beard, etc. Of course, in the cinema or in a photograph, you do not normally get to select many of those parameters independently (except, in the list above, for the crown and even, to some extent, the beard): you have to make do with the extended chunk of properties carrying the name of a particular actor. The independent choice of each property is of course, in this case, a fiction, but still, some choices may gain more importance than others and determine the selection of the actor. In a drawing, on the other hand, in an animated movie, or even in something looking more or less like an ordinary film but produced with the help of 3D rendition software, there is a possibility of picking the properties piecemeal. In the case of classical cinema, most of your options may appear to be set, once you decide on the actor, but there still is the question of showing him from different angles, distances, and the like, which is something the verbal text does not have to decide.

Unlike intralinguistic transposition, however, intersemiotic transposition certainly is (in the normal case) a double act of communication which has to take into account the sending and receiving instances of both acts involved. But there are other problems with this kind of “translation” in quotation marks. For, while the goal of translation proper, at least at present, is certainly to convey as much of the meaning of the source text as possible, this is probably rarely the case of someone making a film based on a particular novel. Rather, the novel is a pretext for a new creation, which, on rare occasions (as in the case of Tarkovsky’s *Solaris*), may have a much richer content than the novel offering the pretext. The case may be different with the illustrations which draughtsmen have made for famous works of literary art, as the drawings of Sandro Botticelli, William Blake, Gustave Dorée, and others, destined to accompany Dante’s *Divina Comedia*. In all these cases, further investigation will certainly be required to tell apart the contribution of fidelity to the source, to other purposes, to more or less unconscious cultural influences at the time of production, and even, of course, to personal whim, which might be able to account for the differences between these series of pictures purporting to illustrate the same literary work.
4. **Within the same semiotic resources**

Gorlée does not seem to have anything to say about the second kind of “translation” in quotation marks’ distinguished by Jakobson. Although she mentions it several times, when she quotes Jakobson’s scheme (sometimes confusing inter- and intralinguistic ‘translation’; see Gorlée 2015: 113, something which is all too easy to do), she never delves deeper into its nature. Elsewhere, I have suggested that Jakobson’s intralinguistic ‘translation’ sometimes can be similar to translation proper, if the regulatory instance is the audience, and that it can be quite different, if the regulatory instance is the referent (see Sonesson 2014a, b).

In the case of intralinguistic transposition, no double act would seem to be needed, at least not any act involving an additional participant. At first, it may seem to be quite the opposite of translation: while in translation, you search for a new expression trying to hold the content as stable as possible, here you substitute a new sign whose content is held partly constant but whose expression may become completely different in order to be truer to the referent. In this case, the regularity instance is reference: while taking into account the nature of the referent, you search for the proper term.

However, if we suppose the substitution of words to be made for the benefit of a particular audience, such as children or foreigners with a limited command of the language involved, intralinguistic transposition becomes more similar to translation. Here the regulatory instance, as in translation, is the audience. You try to convey the same meaning, to the extent that this is possible, to a receiver disposing of a different and/or more limited pool of knowledge. Still this is no double act of communication. There is no double audience. Even if we suppose that the subject ‘translates’ from what he first meant to say, he does not have to account for the conditions of any earlier act – and this is a difference to true translation. Expanding the perspective from words to discourse, however, intralinguistic ‘translation’ is seen to be heavily dependent on the extra-linguistic or extra-signic environment. In a way, that which is not present as a real object in the perceptual situation has to be ‘translated’ (or transposed) into language, while the objects perceived can, at least in part, be left out of the ‘translation’. Differences of environment may also make the difference for ‘translation proper’, first, because the extra-linguistic and/or extra-signic environment may be different, and second, because the rules of redundancy may differ.

These are two reasons for making changes to the expression used, although staying within the same language and the same semiotic resource. This prompts the question whether changes from one language to another and/or form one semiotic resource to another may also depend on such reasons. It seems rather obvious that the change from one language to another has its regulatory source in the audience addressed rather than the adequate description of the referent or anything else, but perhaps there may still be other concurrent goals involved. For instance, I may be able to discuss Swedish phenomena and Mexican phenomena with wife in each of the corresponding languages. As for the passage from one semiotic resource to another, for instance from writing to pic-
tures, it clearly depends on the shift of audience in the famous case of Church frescos playing the part of the ‘pauper’s bible’, but it is not certain that such a case can be generalized. Might it not be true that some referents, or some pieces of information about referents, can be more easily conveyed by one semiotic resource than by another? This, of course, was the claim of Gotthold Ephraim Lessing’s (1964 [1767]) *Lakoon*, according to which temporal objects were better rendered by language, and spatial objects in pictures (see some criticism of this in Sonesson 1996; 2007; 2014b).

5. Then what more is ‘transduction’?

If we consider the three cases purportedly involving transduction treated more fully in Gorlée’s (2015: 130ff) recent book, Henry Thoreau’s habit of quoting Homeric poetry and applying it to the American landscape, *Peer Gynt* as a work not only by Henrik Ibsen but also by Edvard Grieg, and Salvador Dalí’s paraphrase of *Venus of Milo* with drawers added, it is difficult to recognize any transduction in them, if this term is to be taken in the sense in which Jakobson talked about transmutation (and I talked about transposition). Grieg’s music, to be sure, could be taken as a kind of ‘illustration’ to Ibsen’s work, similar in that respect to the case of Botticelli’s, Blake’s and Dorée’s illustrations of Dante, but, even more than the latter, it can hardly function as such than in juxtaposition to Ibsen’s work. It is true than some of Gorlée’s remarks (2015: 171ff) could be taken to suggest that some kind of fairly abstract iconicity, notably to Nordic folklore, is shared by Grieg’s music and, perhaps not so much Ibsen’s words, as his characters and motifs. My reason for thinking that Grieg’s music can be iconic to Ibsen’s work, or to some meaning they have in common, only when juxtaposed to Ibsen’s work, is that, unlike the illustrations to Dante, music on its own does not carry very much meaning for which a correspondence can be found in visual perception and/or its verbalization (see Monelle 1992; Agawu 2014). Even in the best case this will only be an instance of what I have elsewhere called *secondary iconicity*, that is, the case where you can see the similarity once you know the meaning (see e.g. Sonesson 1998). The Ibsen–Grieg twosome also seems to be the only case in which Gorlée (2015: 174, 178, 198) quotes, without discussing them, different instances of ‘translation fitting’ involving the same text.

Much more interesting is Gorlée’s mention of cases like the translation/transduction (unclear in the context) of ‘a love letter from English to Chinese, a legal marriage contract from Arabic to Dutch, an operatic libretto from old Italian to modern English’ (Gorlée 2015: 20, 91). Something similar to the last case obviously applies to the English translation of Ibsen’s text when they accompany Grieg’s melodies, and in fact, even before that, to the extent that the original text follows a particular metre and/or obeys the constraints of rhyming. If, except for conveying the same ideas from one language to another, you also have to follow the same metre, or adapt the text to rhymes in another language, or adapt the text to the constraints of singing (in the same or
in another language), then there clearly are other schemata which regulates your task apart from translation. Thus, it could be said that, apart from being a more or less truthful rendering of the meaning of Ibsen’s text, a literary translation must also conform to the constraints of metrability and rhymability, and, when the text is set to Grieg’s music, it must also comply with the demand for songability. It seems to me that we are here concerned with what different traditions have called ‘schemes’ or ‘scripts’, of which the more obvious instances may be the conventions for writing love letters or contracts in different languages, and even, as I suggested above, for being courteous in different cultures sharing more or less the same language. It would take us too far, in the present context, to enter the discussion of the different ideas which have been formed about this phenomenon in different traditions, but, for the time being, we will have to be content with suggesting that this has something to do with what Alfred Schütz called ‘systems of relevancies’, of which different societies possess different sets (see Sonesson, to appear a).

It seems to me that these are cases of intersemiosis not dreamt of by Jakobson. They are different, but somewhat comparable to cases in which not only the semiotic resource, but the particular language used, may remain constant, and in which the content can also be fairly similar, but were the meaning of the content has been subtly contrived so as to produce phenomena to which terms such as parody and satire have traditionally been applied, and which Gérard Genette has characterized as different variants of hypotextuality. Michael Bakhtin (1984; 1986) and Gérard Genette (1992) are well-known for having tried to delve deeper into this kind of discourse and, in the latter case, to classify its forms. It is therefore surprising that these authors and their contributions are not mentioned by Gorlée (2015), although she several times uses the term ‘intertextuality’, which Julia Kristeva is famous for having introduced as a French term for the kind of phenomena discussed by Bakhtin. Nevertheless, the final example given by Gorlée (2015: 201ff), Salvador Dali’s *Venus of Milo* with added drawers, is clearly of this kind. To adapt again the language of Bakhtin, it could be said that, to the layer of socially recognized purposes due to the original creator, a further layer of socially recognized purposes, which overdetermines the former layer, has been appended, producing a parodic and/or satiric purport, which requires the intersemiotic relation to exist, although it does not relate the work in question to any language or semiotic resource, but to another particular work of art.

One may wonder where to place, in this context, Eugene Nida’s (1959; 2003) ideas about adapting the Biblical text, not only to the language of the intended audience, but also to their general world-knowledge and presuppositions, even to the point of transforming the landscape into something the audience will recognize, all in order to convince people in other culture about the core Biblical message. All translation, as all acts of communication, involves some adaptation to the receiver, as well as an adaptation to the sender of the original communicative act, in varying proportions (see Sonesson 2014a, b). But when does such as inter-semiotic act, in the sense in which it includes interlinguistic acts, cease to be merely a translation? Clearly, at some point, the purpose of persuasion becomes paramount (see Sonesson,
to appear b). The difference here, however, is that while there is a source text to which these missionary intentions are added, Nida would certainly not be interested in the original text being recognized beyond that which is presented – and this contrasts with such a recognition being needed for parody and satire being present.

6. Conclusion

On the one hand, Dinda Gorlée’s new book is a rich source for discovering quotations from Peirce which are not in the common market. On the other hand, it purports to go beyond the Jakobsonean quasi-identification, in Jakobson’s terms, of translation proper, rewording, and transmutation. It remains unclear how the former part is supposed to contribute to the latter, in particular without going beyond the references to Peirce’s writings. The contribution of the book consists in the introduction of the notion of transduction, which, although it turns out to be ambiguous, offers some examples which should really be taken into account in the study of intersemiosis, both when, as in the examples given in the running text, it is taken to involve some further schema applied to the outcome of the process of translation, and when it comes close to a notion of Bakhtin, to which Kristeva gave the name intertextuality, and as it was later explored in a more serious fashion by Genette. There is every reason to salute this book for broadening the scope of the domain of intersemiosis beyond the wildest dreams of Roman Jakobson.

NOTES

1 For similar, but also complementary, points, see Jia (2017), which however does not take into account Gorlée’s recent book, nor my papers.
2 A point also made by Silverstein 2003: 76ff.
3 Gorlée (2015: 17) also refers to Keane (2013. 10), who takes the term from Silverstein, but uses it in a more esoteric sense: ‘from invisible to visible, from immaterial to material, and from intelligible to sensible.’

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