Brutalist image as humanist form: Reyner Banham, Erwin Panofsky and the turn to spatio-temporal structures in 1950s histories of (modern) art

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The term New brutalism often echoes an architecturally specific discourse, yet the introduction of the term in Britain in the 50s, looking at the example of Banham’s writings from the Architectural Review, seems to take architecture as a starting point only to discuss a variety of art forms as the new location of avant garde art practices. Those included examples from the historical avant-garde to early precedents of British Pop, such as the artists involved in the Independent Group. In this context, Banham defended and defined a particular understanding of the ‘image’ as an overarching category connected to the idea of ‘form’, which he then tied to a historiographic discourse on architectural theory, perspective and humanism. Despite the emphasis on form, Banham’s notion of New Brutalism may be read, I argue in this paper, as a polemic against formalist art theory and as a critique on the notion of style as the privileged tool of historical explanation in this context. Drawing largely on his published doctoral thesis supervised by Pevsner as Theory and Design in the first machine age, I would like to suggest that Banham’s 1950s discussions on art and painting as forms of a historical experience was conceived and expressed as a polemic against Pevsner’s notion of style as the site of historical explanation, succession and change from the 19th to the 20th century, from his Pioneers of Modern Design. Unlike Pevsner’s preference for style, Banham turns to ‘brutalist form’ which he conceives, along with its precedents in avant garde art and contemporary manifestations in a number of artists, not least those associated with the British Independent Group, as an event, a notion which echoes Panofsky’s 1940s spatio-temporal structures. In the final part of this essay I explore this connection further drawing on Panofsky’s famous essay ‘Art History as a Humanistic Discipline’.

KEYWORDS Reyner Banham, Erwin Panofksy, new brutalism, art historiography

Introduction

In the opening page of his book Theory and Design in the first machine age, Reyner Banham extends the following dedication: “This book”, he writes, “is dedicated to those who made it possible and necessary to write it” (Banham 1960: 2). Banham lists Nikolaus Pevsner, Giovanni Bernasconi, H.L.C. Jaféé, Marcel Duchamp and Alison and Peter Smithson, among others, his dedication attesting, on the one hand, to the broad range of influences and practices that appear to have informed his work, and on the other, to a contemporary difficulty to situate Banham’s primary disciplinary allegiance. And while such a difficulty is often eased by the almost commonplace reading of his work as a landmark in architectural theory, such a reading undermines what I take to be a key objective in
his book, namely the historiographic revision of the modern, recast by Banham against the historical form of avant-garde art and of avant-garde painting, in particular.

Indeed, in Banham’s book, painting and theoretical reflection on painting are closely tied to questions pertaining to the philosophy of history, historiographic issues and to the task of providing a definition for the modern as a historical fact. Unlike a highly abstract theoretical construct, Banham’s modern is historicized and imbued by the same material qualities attributed to avant-garde art and painting in the book, painting itself being treated consistently as a context-dependent and historically specific category, acting, as I would like to suggest, as a material and visual strategy in the course of his argument. Banham’s notion of Brutalist painting, in particular, I would like to argue, forms as a significant theoretical and material technology with which Banham constructs and appropriates his historiographic vision of the modern as a historical fact.

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Indeed, in the book, Banham uses examples of painting from the history of avant-garde art to revisit earlier constructions of the modern, in particular Pevsner’s own in the context of his earlier writings in architectural history. Banham’s dedication to his supervisor in the book and his pronouncing of his book project as a “necessity” are particularly telling in this light, while Banham’s uses of examples from the history of avant-garde art and painting act as strategies crucial for the success of his own project. And if in his book *Pioneers of Modern Design*, in the chapter ‘Eighteen-ninety in painting’, the kind of historical explanation provided by Pevsner drew heavily on examples from 19th-century and early 20th-century art history to outline historical succession, Banham, in his own narrative, concentrates almost exclusively on examples from the avant-garde arts of the early 20th century; cubism and futurism, in particular. Moreover, while in Pevsner’s history of the modern a linear succession of time was adopted, broken down into chronologically defined periods stylistically grasped, style itself being peculiar to the historical context of the 19th century in Pevsner’s argument, in Banham’s account of the modern, avant-garde painting of the 20th century and its particular characteristics chart a clear break with the 19th century, rupture rather than succession being the leading technology adopted by Banham in his narration. And while rupture becomes his privileged explanation for the historical phenomenon of the emergence of the modern, situated in the 20th century and distinguished by a clear break from the 19th century, Banham’s rejection of Pevsner’s foundations of the modern in the 19th century is also a direct critique of Pevsner’s uses of style as a periodizing marker. Furthermore, since style was routinely used to re-present continuity across the arts from the 19th to the 20th century in the context of 20th-century formalist theory, being one of its key theoretical tools, in challenging the validity of Pevsner’s premise, Pevsner’s notion of style as a foundation for the modern and as a 19th-century historical category, Banham might be seen to be implicitly critiquing formalist theory as well; in specific, formalist uses of style as evidence for continuity in history, Fry’s early 20th-century historiographic and curatorial endeavors being a prominent example in this light. Indeed, in his well-known post-impressionist shows of 1914, Fry drew on the notion of style to legitimize the uses of formalist theory in explanations of historical continuity from the 19th century to the 20th century. Unlike the ‘intransient’ object of painting which the formalists envisioned in using style as a form of historical evidence and explanation, Banham’s brutalist painting was context-dependent, temporally and spatially specific, grasped more as an ‘event’ and as a three-dimensional structure as opposed to a two-dimensional visual detail. In disconnecting form from a linear understanding of time flow, form being the event of the rupture, Banham’s brutalist painting as an event, at one and the same time temporally and spatially specific, also critiqued a historiographic understanding of historical time.
grasped as a succession of periods, chronologically and stylistically defined.

If time and in consequence history were to be experienced as temporally and spatially specific form, brutalist painting as evidence presupposed a different order and type of vision, characterized by temporal expansions and contractions grasped against spatially significant pictorial form, when compared to the formalist one; the latter privileging a vertical hierarchy of vision, dominated by the importance of the visual sense, “eye sight alone”, as advocated famously by Greenberg but shared among earlier British formalists such as Fry and Bell right up to later followers such as Fried. And yet, while Banham’s combination of spatiality with temporality in his thinking of evidence demanded both a visual sense and a notion of pictorial form as distributed against a three-dimensional grid of space and time, brutalist painting as a historical explanation sought to articulate similar historical phenomena with the formalists, including ‘abstraction’. The two explanations nevertheless departed from two clearly different visions of historical time which were also historically specific. Unlike the a-temporal neo-Kantian qualities which painting adopted as historical evidence in its formalist reading, Banham’s brutalist painting was both historically contingent and self-aware: cast, his own argument made clear, by way of a historical category, as avant-garde art, which formed, in turn, his starting point for the fashioning of the foundations of modern art. Importantly however, in addition to his attention to spatiality in relation to temporality, Banham’s emphasis on the present and one’s experience of the present, but also his effort to historicize it by way of incorporating it into his project of visual evidence, is particularly important as it is crucial in distinguishing his project from parallel historiographic endeavours of his time. Panofsky’s writings, almost contemporary to Banham, on art historiography and the emphasis on spatio-temporal structures as a ‘humanist form’, may be seen as a context from which Banham’s brutalist form as a humanist form is equally distinct. While in both cases the notions of form, space and time appear to merge with the category of art as visual and historical evidence, the two accounts present differences as to the kind of temporalities which they adopt in relation to the place of human experience in their explanations. For Banham, time, history and brutalist painting are not entities independent from human experience and most importantly from the present, brutalist painting being co-existent with the present and circumscribed by the boundaries of the present, being in effect an event and closer to a relativistic notion of evidence in this light.

Modern art, in particular, he writes, is the embodiment of such a fusion between experience, and one’s experience situated in the present, and the kinds and varieties of space which the 20th century brought about along with the various avant-garde forms of art. If his dedication to Bernasconi and Jaffé are due, as he makes clear, on account of their “publications on Sant’ Elia and de Stijl that materially altered the direction of these studies” – the emphasis here via Sant’ Elia being also on Futurism – the present is literally active also in his historiographic notion of brutalist form as his acknowledgement of Peter and Alison Smithson and of his “own contemporaries” at the end of the book make clear. Banham credits them “for a constant view of the mainstream of modern architecture flowing on, and to the last named in particular for a proposition that, true or false, has been the lodestone of these studies” (Banham 1960: 2). A ‘sense of space’ and the ‘machine aesthetic’, in turn, are two sites of the present but also sites for the activation of the present in his conception and fashioning of brutalist pictorial evidence. “What distinguishes modern architecture,” he notes, “is surely a new sense of space and the machine aesthetic” (Banham 1960: 2). The latter defines a whole period which Banham situates in the 1950s, the period in which the book emerges, and which is characterized by new advents in technology and the adoption of new machines being part of what Banham describes as the ‘machine age’. In the Introduction entitled “The machine age”, Banham asserts, for example, that “this book was written in the late years of the Nineteen fifties, an epoch” called, as he writes, “the Jet Age”, the Detergent Decade, the Second Industrial Revolution” (Banham 1960: 9). And if Banham conceives of modern vision as a historically significant object and an event at the
same time, as an epoch and a fact, beginning with the classic avant-garde arts of the 20th century, he ends with mass culture.

**Avant-garde and mass culture in Banham's notion of modern art**

Thus, an “electric razor” seems to have the same effect in shaping our modern vision – bearing also historical significance as a site where such a vision becomes manifested and enacted across time – allowing however also the very possibility for historical reflection and revision for Banham, as cubist painting, with which he begins his narration. The element in common across the two categories of objects consists in the objects’ ability, but also agency, to construct breaks in ways of thinking, via one’s engagement with the objects, yet mainly while one is acting as a consumer. And such an ability extends from their capacity to break continuity in historical narration and in time as historical evidence into culture, the present cast anew as ‘living’. ‘The technical revolutions of our own time strike us with infinitely greater force because the small things of life have been visibly and audibly revolutionized as well’, Banham writes, “unlike”, in his view, “the cavalry, the growth of feudal organizations, the rise of the money economy “which left the objects of daily life, the hierarchy of the family and the structure of a sociable intercourse almost untouched” (Banham 1960: 9). “Small machines” in turn have contributed to what he describes as a “domestic revolution”, namely those of the hair-dryer, radio, mixers which “make their point of impact on us” (Banham 1960: 10). The latter seems to describe, in Banham’s own words, a process of Westernization understood as overconsumption. “Even a man who does not possess an electric razor is likely – in the Westernized World at least – to dispense some previously inconceivable product”, he writes for example, “such as an aerosol shaving cream, from an equally unprecedented pressurized container, and accept with equanimity the fact that he can afford to throw away regularly” (Banham 1960: 9). The latter, the advent of small machines and their impact on the domestic, is applauded, in turn, as a democratic effect on society; the latter because “it was in the hands of an élite, rather than the masses, that the symbolic machine of that First Machine Age was delivered, the automobile” (Banham 1960: 9-10). “The Man Multiplied by the Motor”, “to use Marinetti’s phrase,” Banham explains, “was a different kind of man to the horse-and buggy men who ruled the world since the time of Alexander the Great.” (Banham 1960: 10). On the one hand, this reading of the motor, and the ways of domesticating access to power which it unleashed for the masses on the precondition of mass consumption and money exchange, also by way of comparisons with futurism, is important as it shows the proximity in Banham’s thinking between the category of the avant-garde and that of mass culture. Conditions of consumptions replace processes of production in his definition of the modern which in a way seems to be completely detached from 19th-century theory of political economy. The latter point may be seen both as a critique of Pevsner’s reliance on the 19th century to construct a foundation for the modern as well as again a critique of Greenberg’s distance from the equation between avant-garde and mass culture in his famous essay ‘Avant-garde and Kitch’, an essay and position which seem to have furnished much of the positions adopted by pop artists and their predecessors in the 1950s in the US, but also in Britain, with the example of the Independent Group being a most prominent one. On the other hand, Banham sees in the rise of mass culture, in what he defines and what defines as the modern, a democratic turn whereby consumption overcomes control of production means. “Under these changed circumstances”, he writes, “that barrier of incomprehension that had stood between thinking men and their mechanized environment all through the nineteenth century, in the mind of Marx as much as in the mind of Morris, began to crumble” (Banham 1960: 11). Mass culture, like avant-garde, form a clear break with the 19th century in this light, he concludes, his fashioning of the modern in these terms being proof of the inadequacies of Pevsner’s account. “The human chain of Pioneers of the Modern Movement that ex-
tends back from Gropius to William Morris, and beyond him to Ruskin, Pugin and William Blake, does
not extend forward from Gropius,” he asserts, adding that, “the precious vessel of handicraft aesthet-
ics that had been passed from hand to hand, was dropped and broken, and no one has bothered to
pick the pieces” (Banham 1960: 12). And Banham is also eager to emphasize on another occasion the
debt of his thought and by consequence the proximity of his notion of the modern to the experience
of the West and of its mass culture. 2

Banham’s discourse on painting

Why avant-garde painting? On the one hand it is easy to comprehend Banham’s turn to avant-gar-
de painting as a means of critique addressed against Pevsner’s uses of style and 19th-century art as
examples in his account. 3 On the other hand, Banham’s antipathy for formalism expressed indirectly
in his arguments and notion of brutalist form can also be justified in the context of the same antipa-
thy for the 19th century as a foundation for the modern. His discussion on Futurism in chapter 8, enti-
tled “The futurist manifesto”, might be seen as an example of Banham’s uses of avant-garde painting
to attack formalist theory and Fry in particular. The “Technical Manifesto still gives no directives as
to what a Futurist painting should look like in material fact”, he writes, adding that “its tabulated
propositions formulate a frame of mind only” (Banham 1960: 108). He lists the points which in the
manifesto proclaim a series of elements for futurist expression, but also those elements the futurists
“combat”, the word itself taken from the manifesto. His comments on Fry are introduced on account
of “negative proposition no. 3” (Banham 1960: 108), which Banham pronounces as “rather remarka-
ble for its date” (Banham 1960: 109), “for the general tendency of European avant-garde aesthetics
at the time was to continue the academicising tendencies of the Nineties, as can be seen from the
writings of Roger Fry” (Banham 1960: 109). For these tendencies, he writes in a footnote discussion,
His next statement though gives us a sense of the reasons why Banham is against Fry’s formalist aes-
thetics, but also the aesthetics which developed around cubism equally taking formalism as a starting
point. Having added “or the Cubist circle in Paris” next to his reference to Fry, in the same sentence
he goes on to state that “the Futurists seem to have been almost alone in seeing that Platonic and
Classicising aesthetics were out of tune with their mechanolatry, or indeed, any positive and fruitful
accommodation to the new technology” (Banham 1960: 109). The word accommodation here seems
to be at odds with idealization implied by Platonic aesthetics and expresses rather a pragmatist view
with which Banham is happy – describing such an incident of accommodation as a ‘fruitful’ one.

From another, contemporary to Banham perspective, his uses of painting to construct a cri-
tique of the modern might be seen at odds with the actual place of painting in avant-garde art of
the 1950s but also architectural practice and theory as well. In the example of the show Parallels of
Life and Art organized by the Independent Group, only Pollock’s work appeared. 4 Indeed, the show
included a singular example of painting, Pollock’s abstract expressionism, the work’s presence in the
conditions articulated by the ‘editors’ being concerned with the notions which the show addressed
and which might also be seen as part of a critique of a contemporary formalist reading of such work.
While the place of avant-garde alongside mass culture in Banham’s notion of the painting has an
early opposite precedent in Greenberg’s seminal essay ‘Avant-garde art and Kitch’, in the context of
the display logic as explained in the notes at the Tate Archive, the painting could hardly be seen to
fit with the formalist normative paradigm of Greenberg’s explanation of modernism as the latter had
taken shape in the 1950s and early 1960s in his writings championing Pollock. 5 The nature of the his-
toriographic project which Banham’s brutalist painting implied if compared with the way in which the
painting was interpreted in the show seems at odds with Greenberg’s 1950s and 1960s formalism,
despite their shared point of departure: the question of the avant-garde’s collapse into mass culture. And yet, ‘abstraction’ was a notion crucial for the articulation of the modern in Banham’s project as well as in Greenberg’s writings. At the same time, the notion of abstract art, fairly new in the 1950s, had a mirror image in the same period in the historiography of art, being an example where new historiographic accounts could be tested whether on modern art or indeed against earlier periods. Panofsky himself had drawn on the same notion as well as on technology to construct art history as a ‘humanistic’ discipline, while Banham’s experiment in historiography shared Panofsky’s respect for spatio-temporal structures, as well as discourses on modern physics as explanatory devices for the very historical phenomena of abstraction and form in art. Banham’s reading of painting in the context of modern physics, very much like Panofsky, seems to depart from examples and writings which date from the early 20th century yet in which Banham quite clearly defends special relativity as a tool for the interpretation of avant-garde art. “Boccioni’s Technical Manifesto of Futurist sculpture appeared in April 1912”, he writes, adding that “it was entirely his own responsibility, and since the actual turn of phrase is not particularly Marinettian, probably entirely his own work” (Banham 1960: 112). According to Banham, the first section was a “routine rhetorical denunciation of the past and unoriginality” yet the second justified “the word technical far more fully” than did “the painting Manifesto”, since after Paris Boccioni “knew what the result should look like” (Banham 1960: 112). According to Banham it was “in connection with Boccioni’s sculptural activities of 1912 that the growing fusion between Parisian practice and Milanese theory” was most “clearly manifested” (Banham 1960: 111). His plate number 35 depicted a work by Braque, “one of the works by which cubism could be defined, with its highly fragmented simultaneous vision of scattered aspects of the visual scene” (Banham 1960: 113). On the following similarity across vision, Banham cited the following extract from Boccioni’s manifesto on futurist sculpture:

> We must begin with the central nucleus of an object as it strives for realization, in order to discover the new laws, that is, the new forms, that relate it invisibly but mathematically to the plastic infinity within, and visible plastic infinity without. The new plasticity will thus be the translation into plaster, bronze, glass, wood, or any other material, of the atmospheric planes that unite and intersect visible objects…Thus sculpture may bring objects to life by rendering apprehensible, plastic and systematic their prolongations into space, since it cannot be doubted any longer that one object finishes where another begins, and that there is not an object around us – bottle, automobile, tree, house or street – that does not cut and section us with some arabesque of curved or straight lines (Banham 1960: 112).

Banham’s interpretation of the passage in Theory and Design is particularly telling. He writes:

> The drawing discussed above is, of course, a more or less programmatic demonstration of this field theory of aesthetic space, a space which exists as a field of force or influence radiating from the geometrical center of the objects which give rise to it, and is a remarkable poetic achievement born, presumably of Bergson and Einstein (Banham 1960: 109).

His footnote discussion elucidates this point further: “Bergson”, he writes, “was widely discussed at the time: in the circle of the magazine Poesia, in the Apollinaire circle… and by Vorticists in England. The situation with Einstein is less clear: ideas marginal to the theories of relativity were certainly current in Cubist circles…it would appear that Giedion’s proposition that resemblances between the painting of the period and Einsteinian ideas are ‘simply a temporal coincidence’ should be treated with some reserve – the possibility of consciously ‘Relativistic’ art cannot be ruled out (Banham 1960: 112).
And yet, following Martin Kemp’s reading of Panofsky’s perspective and science during the same period, Banham’s and Panofsky’s readings of painting in the context of their historiographic endeavours may be seen to part in one significant aspect concerned with the treatment of time. If for Banham the present was active, time having an impact on both human experience and the writing of the latter as a historiographic act, for Panofsky such an association was denounced. And in this light, Banham’s object of modern art cast as a historiographic project afforded by a new reading of the abstracted, or fragmented painting, contained at least one precedence in the 1950s, or as already articulated by Panofsky as early as the 1940s, in which the re-claiming of pictorial space comprised a question crucial to the historiographic project. In the context of the latter, and unlike Banham’s view of history as temporally and spatially experienced, Panofsky argued for the composition of pictorial space, perspective as a symbolic form. As outlined as early as 1924, such an understanding of pictorial space could deliver humanist values again in society and art history; provided art history turned its attention to history and its methods of analysis.

**Banham and Panofsky**

Unlike Banham’s uncertainty for the legitimacy of his method and evidence of space, for Panofsky, perspective was the ‘realist’ site and the means by which a reliable description and explanation could be achieved, a site and method that safeguarded, by extension, art history from a relativistic leap, as Martin Kemp has argued in his wonderful ‘Relativity not Relativism: some thoughts on the histories of science and art having reread Panofsky’ (Kemp 1995). As Panofsky asserted in the 1940s in his famous essay ‘History of Art as a humanistic discipline’, “to grasp reality we have to detach ourselves from the present”. In the same essay, he noted that “Philosophy and mathematics do this by building systems in a medium which is by definition not subject to time”, adding that “Natural science and the humanities do it by creating these spatio-temporal structures which I have called the ‘cosmos of nature’ and the ‘cosmos of culture’” (Panofsky 2007: 27-28). In the same essay Panofsky made a reference to abstract art comparing a machine to an abstract painting, the latter, in his view, being a more impressive expression of the idea of abstract form, while the first of the idea of functional content (Panofsky 2007: 18).

Both, he asserts, may be seen to have minimal content (Panofsky 2007: 18). It seems that Panofsky at that point was considering questions which would become of interest to other historical projects including Banham’s later notion of brutalist painting. As his 1955 essay ‘The New Brutalism’ published in Architectural Review shows, he adopted historiographic concepts similar to Panofsky’s, such as the event and spatio-temporal structures, in order to narrate breaks and discontinuities in the history of ‘modern art’, yet drawing on a different use of time as pertaining to his notion of visual and historical evidence for the modern. Banham’s notion of a brutalist image was different also in an additional aspect if compared to Panofsky’s historiographic experiment, being politically and ideologically charged, an object of polemic as well as revision. Brutalism itself was conceived, as Banham argued in 1955, as a polemical concept, the term being suggestive of associations with a community of people sharing “a tendency to look toward Le Corbusier, and to be aware of something called le beton brut” (Banham 1955). At the level of affect, Banham’s notion of new brutalism seemed to express an antipathy for “a quasihistorical concept, oriented, however spuriously, toward that mid-nineteenth century epoch which was marxism’s Golden Age, when you could recognize a capitalist when you met him”, which he associated with the term “the New Humanism” (Banham 1955). In the same 1955 essay he defined the latter as a form of architectural experiment in revival carried out in the Soviet East, Morris here too having an equally debased or defunct, as he put it, position in Banham’s discourse as in his 1950s and 1960s historiographic experiment in the history of modern art.
NOTES

1. An early version of this paper was presented to the Association of Art Historians’ Annual Meeting of April 2013 at the Royal College of Arts, London, under the title ‘Brutalist image as humanist form: expanding the architectural medium in Banham’s 1950s criticism’.


4. For a reconstruction of the exhibition see the accompanying publication Victoria Walsh, 2001. *Nigel Henderson Parallel of Life and Art*, Foreword and Afterword by Peter Smithson, London: Thames and Hudson. See also the follow-up in the 2015 exhibition at Tate Britain New Brutalist Image 1949-55


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